Civil Conflict Fragmentation and the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations by Ari, Baris & Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene
2 
 
Civil Conflict Fragmentation and the Effectiveness of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations 
Barış Arıa* and Theodora-Ismene Gizelisb 
aSchool of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, UK; bDepartment 
of Government, University of Essex, UK 
*corresponding author: baris.ari@durham.ac.uk  
Funding details 
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council under grants 
1511566 and ES/T006013/1. 
Acknowledgments 
We are grateful to Daina Chiba, Tobias Böhmelt, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, two 
anonymous reviewers and the editors of International Peacekeeping for their 
constructive comments and suggestions. Previous versions of this article were presented 
at the 2017 annual convention of the International Studies Association, 2017 annual 
conference of the International Association for Peace and Conflict Studies and the 
North‐East Research Development Workshop (Durham University and Newcastle 
University).  
Biographical note 
BARIŞ ARI, PhD in Government (University of Essex, 2018); Postdoctoral Research 
Fellow, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University.  
THEODORA-ISMENE GIZELIS, PhD in Political Science and Economics (Claremont 





While the extant literature has highlighted the importance of UN peacekeeping 
operations (PKOs) in addressing commitment problems in civil wars, actor 
fragmentation presents additional challenges for conflict resolution. A higher 
number of competing actors not only worsens coordination problems, but also 
aggravates the risk of opposition to a peace process, generating an environment 
prone to spoiler violence. This article argues that UN interventions matter more 
when commitment and coordination problems are worse, which corresponds to 
known traits of fragmented conflicts. Using data on civil conflict duration and 
intensity, we present evidence that UN PKOs are effective at mitigating adverse 
impacts of fragmentation. Fragmented conflicts are both longer and deadlier 
when the UN is not involved to support a peace process, while UN peacekeeping 
mitigates the effects of fragmentation. 





UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) can be effective in supporting peace processes, but 
often the UN is ineffective if spoilers1 control conflict dynamics and parties are not 
willing or ready to make peace.2 Since the end of the Cold War, nearly a third of civil 
war terminations involved a political settlement of some sort.3 Yet, peace processes 
become fragile if fragmentation intersects with identity politics as several unsuccessful 
attempts at negotiation in Syria illustrate.4  Fragmentation not only increases the 
likelihood of infighting within groups, but also exacerbates commitment problems by 
diminishing the value of expected gains from compromise5 and by making future shifts 
in power more likely6 –often hindering the UN from effectively supporting peace.7 
Nonetheless, the empirical literature finds evidence that UN PKOs go to such hard 
cases.8 Although studies examining the overall effectiveness of UN peacekeeping often 
control for rebel fragmentation as an indicator of conflict intractability, few studies 
explore whether the UN mitigates the adverse effects of fragmentation.9 Focusing on the 
difference that UN peacekeeping makes in fragmented civil wars, we argue that the UN 
 
1 Spoiler refers to a conflict-party or a faction that opposes a peace process and attempts to 
undermine it, especially through violent actions. See Stedman, “Spoiler Problems.” 
2 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War. 
3 Kreutz, “How and When.” 
4 Bakke et al., “A Plague of Initials”; Pearlman and Cunningham, “Nonstate Actors.” 
5 Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War”; Cunningham, “Actor Fragmentation”; Kydd and Walter, 
“Sabotaging the Peace”; Rudloff and Findley, “The Downstream Effects.”  
6 Christia, Alliance Formation. 
7 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
8 Beardsley and Schmidt, “Following the Flag”; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 




alleviates the adverse effects of rebel fragmentation on conflict duration and intensity. 
Our paper makes two key contributions. First, we bridge the literatures on 
conflict fragmentation and UN peacekeeping effectiveness to examine the interaction 
between the two processes. We find that UN interventions should matter more when 
commitment and coordination problems are worse, which corresponds to known traits 
of fragmented conflicts.10  Second, existing empirical studies measure fragmentation 
using the number of rebel groups, but this measurement does not capture differences 
between rebel groups in terms of their prominence in a conflict. Fragmentation is more 
than just the number of actors in a conflict; power dynamics and degree of actors’ 
institutionalization also constitute key dimensions of fragmentation as a concept.11  To 
account for such nuances in conflict dynamics, we build the Conflict Fragmentation 
Index (CFI) by adapting the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures 
market concentration through relative size of firms in an industry.12  
Overall, the quantitative and comparative literature provides increasing support 
for a conflict dampening impact of UN peacekeeping.13 UN PKOs save lives,14 support 
 
10 Here we define UN involvement as the deployment of peacekeeping missions that are 
mandated to engage in activities such as patrolling, monitoring, and disseminating 
information.  
11 Bakke et al., “A Plague of Initials.” 
12 Rhoades, “The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.” 
13 Hegre et al., “Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing”; Howard, Power in Peacekeeping. 




post-conflict peace,15 and reduce civil war duration both at the national and local level.16  
Furthermore, PKOs, especially larger PKO missions, can change the conflict dynamics 
by modifying the perception of actors as to whether they have an opportunity to raise 
resources and engage both in in-fighting and fighting against the government.17  In this 
paper, we argue that if the commitment problems are mild, the UN role in containing or 
resolving a conflict will be of limited value. However, if the commitment problems are 
severe, then the UN become even more important. 
While the literature has addressed the relevance of the UN in mitigating the 
commitment problems emerging in civil wars, fragmentation presents additional 
challenges for conflict management.  First, fragmentation leads to coordination 
problems making a stable agreement difficult. Second, the larger number of competing 
actors further aggravates the risk of opposition to specific deals and proposals.18 The 
UN becomes particularly relevant in these hard and highly fragmented conflicts by 
enhancing moderates, discouraging spoilers and mitigating both commitment and 
coordination problems among actors. 
We empirically test the implications of our theoretical framework in two ways. 
First, we investigate civil conflict termination by using a global dataset for the period 
1990-2013.19 We expect fragmentation to prolong conflict, but the effect should be 
conditional on UN peacekeeping. Our results are in line with this expectation:   
 
15 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Hultman et al., “United Nations Peacekeeping 
Dynamics”; Mac Ginty et al., “Liberal Peace.” 
16 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Hegre et al., “Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing”; Ruggeri 
et al., “Winning the Peace Locally.” 
17 Ruggeri et al. “Winning the Peace Locally.” 
18 Cunningham, “Veto Players.” 
19 Kreutz, “How and When.” 
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fragmentation without UN involvement is associated with longer conflicts whereas UN 
peacekeeping mitigates the adverse impact of fragmentation on the likelihood of 
conflict termination. Second, we replicate an influential study by Hultman, Kathman 
and Shannon by introducing our conflict fragmentation measure and interacting it with 
the number of UN troops – the main explanatory variable of the study.20 Hultman, 
Kathman and Shannon find that UN troops decrease the number of battle related deaths 
in African civil conflicts from 1992 to 2011. In line with our expectations, we find 
evidence that fragmentation in a given month is associated with higher battle deaths in 
the following month when there is no UN troop deployment. However, UN troop 
deployment renders the impact of fragmentation indistinguishable from zero.  
The remaining of our paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews 
the literature on fragmentation to unpack the key mechanisms that lead to intractability 
in fragmented conflicts. In the following section, we formulate our core argument by 
identifying the avenues within which UN involvement interacts with the conflict 
prolonging impacts of fragmentation. We also outline the implications of our theoretical 
framework. In the fourth section, we discuss our Research Design and explain the 
construction of the Conflict Fragmentation Index. The fifth section presents our 
empirical results and we conclude in section six.  
2. Fragmentation and conflict intractability 
The growing literature on actor fragmentation has drawn attention to several insights. 
First, in many conflicts, the “sides” fighting one another are far from unitary.21 
Opposition movements often consist of numerous factions fighting in the name of the 
 
20 Hultman et al., “Beyond Keeping Peace.” 
21 Pearlman and Cunningham, “Nonstate Actors.” 
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same constituency,22 and the state itself may lack organizational cohesion.23 Second, 
and related, even though there may be unity in terms of what a group is fighting 
against—e.g. overthrowing the regime, as in conflicts over central government control, 
or not wanting to be part of the state, as in territorial struggles—there may be 
disagreement about what the factions within the group are fighting for.24 Often 
divergent intra-group preferences are not visible until after the dispute ends.25  For 
example, in Libya the various factions agreed that they wanted to topple the Gaddafi 
regime, but they have since had serious differences with regards to what the central 
government should look like, and what the regional distribution of power should be. 
Third, such deviations matter for conflict dynamics. To the degree that 
opposition movements consist of numerous factions, each faction finds itself in a dual 
struggle, against both the state and the other factions within the movement, with 
implications for how violence unfolds,26  as well as whether and how the conflict comes 
to an end27  —which have seen play out in failed attempts at negotiation in Syria in the 
last few years. 
The literature presents at least three distinct mechanisms that render 
fragmentation an impediment to conflict resolution. First and foremost, fragmentation 
exacerbates commitment problems. Implementing a peace agreement depends on 
 
22 Bakke et al., “A Plague of Initials”; Cunningham, “Shirts Today.” 
23 Carey et al., “States, the Security Sector”; Clayton and Thomson, “The Enemy of my 
Enemy”; Jentzsch et al., “Militias in Civil Wars.” 
24 Cunningham, “Divide and Conquer.” 
25 Suhrke, “Reconstruction as Modernization.”  
26 Cunningham et al., “Shirts Today.”; Fjelde and Nilsson, “Rebels against Rebels”; Lawrence 
“Triggering Nationalist Violence”; Seymour, “Why Factions Switch Sides.” 
27 Cunningham, “Divide and Conquer”; Johnston, “Negotiated Settlements”; Nilsson, “Partial 
Peace”; Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out.”  
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whether the warring parties can trust both the other side and their own allies to abide by 
the provisions of the deal reached.28 Internal cohesion of actors may affect their ability 
to make credible promises as splintering may lead to the recurrence of violence.29 As 
Blattman and Miguel argue, “the possibility that groups might split could exacerbate 
commitment problems’’ because “signing a peace deal with a rebel group leader is of 
limited value if hard-liners are able to secede and continue fighting.’’30  Often, 
fragmentation generates credible commitment problems because junior partners of a 
military alliance cannot be sure that their stronger allies would not double-cross them in 
the post-conflict era.31 As a result, junior coalition actors have incentives to keep the 
conflict ongoing.   
Second,  the internal contestation theory reveals the incentives for spoiling in 
fragmented conflicts.32 According to Pearlman, actors may choose to engage in either 
peace making or peace breaking to improve “their position in an internal balance of 
power.”33 Through violent actions during a peace process, therefore, spoilers might be 
“aiming to coerce rivals within their own community” rather than undermining the 
external enemy.34 The possibility of losing power in this internal balance of power leads 
factions to reject peace deals that are compatible with their preferences. In other words, 
actors shy away from reaching a peaceful resolution because of leadership contests 
 
28 Hoddie and Hartzell, “Institutionalizing Peace”; Kydd and Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace”; 
Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out”; Stedman, “Spoiler Problems”; Walter, “The Critical 
Barrier.” 
29 Cunningham, “Actor Fragmentation”;  Rudloff and Findley, “The Downstream Effects.” 
30 Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War”, 16.  
31 Christia, Alliance Formation. 
32 Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out.” 
33 Ibid., 83. 
34 Ibid, 82. 
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within their movement, rather than focusing on the main incompatibility with other 
actors. 
Alternatively, Cunningham proposes a veto-player framework as a distinct 
mechanism within which fragmentation emerges as an obstacle to conflict resolution 
through the proliferation of preferences.35 Rebel fragmentation increases the number of 
actors that formulate preferences over a wide range of issues, making consensus hard to 
reach. Therefore, the higher the number of actors involved in a civil war, the less likely 
to reach a resolution through negotiations.  
Peace agreements and ceasefires may provide opportunities for government and 
rebel authorities to strengthen their hand or can lead to rebel fragmentation.36 Forms of 
conflict management such as direct negotiation and mediation can facilitate peace 
processes by supporting the flow of information between the belligerents and enhancing 
transparency in the real interests of actors. Information about the implementation of the 
peace agreement is crucial for its success, because the peace process provides 
opportunities that can lead to moral hazard and opportunistic behavior. Even if the 
fighting conclusively demonstrated relative military strength, government and rebels 
may remain uncertain about the relative support among the population. Often, neither 
the government nor the rebels tend to have full control over parts of the country leaving 
lawlessness in areas where local gangs or transnational actors fill the power vacuum.37 
Yet, conflicts end, even the most fragmented ones. This raises the question how highly 
fragmented conflicts end and how actors can reach a stable agreement. 
 
35 Cunningham, “Veto Players.” 
36 Fjelde and Nilsson, “The Rise of Rebel Contenders”; Ruggeri et al., “Winning the Peace 
Locally.” 
37 Buhaug et al., “Geography, rebel capability.” 
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3. UN Peacekeeping in highly fragmented conflicts 
A growing number of studies present evidence that UN PKOs are on average effective 
at saving lives and making peace, defined as the absence of violent armed conflict. The 
literature investigates conflict dampening effects of UN PKOs through various 
channels.38 Civil wars tend to spread from one country to another,39 but peacekeeping 
contains conflict and prevents spill overs.40 In post-conflict environments, UN PKOs 
decrease the likelihood of conflict recurrence.41 In the context of comprehensive peace 
agreements, UN involvement also increases overall accord implementation, which is 
likely to make an additional indirect contribution to the durability of peace.42 Regarding 
ongoing conflicts, the effectiveness of UN PKOs is contested,43 but numerous studies 
argue that they reduce conflict duration both at the national and local level.44 The 
presence of UN peacekeepers also reduces both civilian casualties45 and the intensity of 
violence between the combatants.46 Through fine-grained sub-national data, a series of 
 
38 Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, 11; Sandler “International Peacekeeping.” 
39 Gleditsch, Transnational Dimensions. 
40 Beardsley, “Peacekeeping and the Contagion”; Beardsley and Gleditsch, “Peacekeeping as 
Conflict Containment.” 
41 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep”; Gilligan and 
Sergenti, “Do UN Interventions”; Hultman et al., “United Nations Peacekeeping 
Dynamics”; Mac Ginty et al., “Liberal Peace.” 
42 Maekawa et al., “UN Involvement”; Mac Ginty et al., “Liberal Peace.” Note that both accord 
implementation and UN peacekeeping have separate independent impacts on the durability 
of peace whereas the latter also has a positive impact on the former.   
43 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Gilligan and Sergenti, “Do UN Interventions.” 
44 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Hegre et al., “Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing”; Ruggeri 
et al., “Winning the Peace Locally.”  
45 Hultman et al., “United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian.” 
46 Hultman et al., “Beyond Keeping Peace.” 
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recent studies further unpacked local-level dynamics and linked the reduction in 
violence to the presence of UN peacekeeping personnel in local geographies.47 These 
empirical innovations help to isolate the conflict dampening impact of UN 
peacekeeping.  
The theoretical literature presents four mechanisms to explain how UN 
peacekeeping reduces conflict: addressing commitment problems; discouraging 
spoilers; facilitating coordination and communication between the belligerents. We 
argue that each of these four mechanisms interact with fragmentation and mitigate its 
conflict instigating effects.  
Addressing commitment problems 
First and foremost, UN PKOs provide vital security guarantees to conflict parties and 
act as an essential external enforcement mechanism.48 Without such security guarantees 
and external enforcement, civil wars are unlikely to be resolved through negotiated 
means because the belligerents cannot credibly commit to abide by the terms of a peace 
deal. Through inducements and deterrence, UN PKOs raise both the benefits of 
compliance with the peace process and the costs of defection.49 Moreover, accepting a 
UN peacekeeping mission presents a costly signal that a conflict actor –especially the 
state-party– is willing to act in accordance with the peace process even in the long 
 
47 Bara, “Shifting targets”; Cil et al., “Mapping blue helmets”; Fjelde et al., “Protection Through 
Presence”; Hunnicutt and Nomikos, “Nationality, Gender, and Deployments at the Local 
Level”. 
48 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Walter, “The Critical 
Barrier.” 
49 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Howard, Power in Peacekeeping. 
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term.50 As such, UN PKOs change the incentives of conflict parties and reduce 
commitment problems. 
Note that commitment problems are neither constant across cases nor stable over 
time.51 For example, if a peace process brings greater propensity of change in future 
capabilities, then commitment problems are worse and the deal is less likely to be self-
enforcing.52 Similarly, if mistrust between parties is deeply engrained, actors are more 
suspicious and will defect when a suitable opportunity arises. The United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), for example, was established to help with the 
enforcement of the Lomé Peace Accord. As part of peacekeeping activities, monitoring 
reduced uncertainty about abiding by the agreed settlement. The latter mattered 
particularly for the rebels because the disarmament program put them in a vulnerable 
position, exposing them to possible government demands to renegotiate the terms of the 
agreement. At the same time the Kabbah government was weak relatively to the RUF 
especially after the sudden death of the chief of defense Maxwell Khobe in April 
2000.53 UNAMSIL was eventually able to mitigate these changes in the parties’ 
capabilities by deploying a substantial number of troops.  
As discussed in the previous section, the longstanding literature on 
fragmentation shows that low internal cohesion and multiple factions make commitment 
problems worse.54 We argue that UN PKOs are instrumental at addressing the negative 
impact of fragmentation. Coupled with security guarantees, building trust among 
 
50 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
51 Kirschner, “Knowing Your Enemy”; Walter, “Bargaining Failures.”  
52 Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem.” 
53 Olonisakin, Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone; Ruggeri et al., “Managing Mistrust.”  
54 Blattman and Miguel, “Civil War”; Cunningham, “Actor Fragmentation”; Christia, Alliance 
Formation; Rudloff and Findley, “The Downstream Effects.” 
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belligerents significantly diminishes commitment problems in fragmented conflicts. In 
the anarchical environment of a fragmented conflict, the UN shifts the balance in favor 
of some factions over others.55 Identifying moderates and strengthening their power vis-
à-vis hardliners is an essential role that UN PKOs play.56 Enabling moderates while 
weakening hardliners enhances cooperation and breaks security dilemma spirals.57 
Thus, the peacekeepers reduce overall uncertainty about the positions and interests of 
the conflict parties, minimizing future security dilemmas. As a result, achieving peace 
becomes more likely, even in fragmented environments in which prospects are 
otherwise grim.  
Discouraging spoilers 
Fragmentation and spoiling are closely linked.58 According to Pearlman, both spoiling 
and fragmentation are endogenous to a peace process because the opportunities for new 
arrangements that the process brings may tip the balance of power within a group.59 The 
position of a faction in this internal balance determines whether spoiling or compliance 
would yield a higher pay-off. Subordinate factions have more to lose from conflict 
resolution because the leadership can steer the peace process to build its internal 
dominance. Subordinate factions are more likely to splinter, adopt hard-line positions, 
and engage in spoiling and violent outbidding. Similarly, peace processes reduce 
 
55 Dorussen and Gizelis, “Into the Lion’s Den.” 
56 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
57 Darby, “The Effects of Violence”; Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Fortna, Does 
Peacekeeping Work? 
58 Bakke et al., “A Plague of Initials”; Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out”; Rudloff and 
Findley, “The Downstream Effects.” 
59 Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out.” 
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strategic barriers to entry and facilitate the emergence of opportunistic original 
groups.60Aspirant political entrepreneurs who were side-lined during the conflict may 
find opportunities to spearhead new violent organizations during the peace process.61 
Spoiling, however, does not always help aspirants and subordinate factions to 
improve their position within the internal balance of power. As Pearlman argues, 
expected benefits from spoiling is a function of public support to the peace process as 
well as material resources and external recognition that the process generates and 
distributes among factions.62 If opportunity structures render spoiling counterproductive 
for strengthening internal position, subordinate factions may seek external recognition 
and material patronage by complying with the peace process.  
The presence of UN PKOs influences opportunity structures for spoiling. Earlier 
research showed that conflict-parties adjust their behaviour in the presence of UN 
PKOs.63 Adopting a hard-line position to pursue an internal leadership contest becomes 
a riskier strategy with a lower expected payoff for two reasons. First, the UN seeks to 
strengthen moderate parties that favour peaceful resolution. Spoiling may cost actors to 
lose valuable external recognition and access to resources. During peace processes, UN 
PKOs are influential at distributing material resources through direct and indirect 
inducements, which may by-pass the institutional hierarchies of conflict in which 
 
60 Fjelde and Nilsson, “The Rise of Rebel Contenders.” 
61 This point is inspired by Pearlman’s composite-actor model and her discussion of the 
Palestinian resistance movement; see Pearlman, “A Composite-actor Approach.” 
62 Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out.” 
63 Beardsley and Gleditsch, “Peacekeeping as Conflict Containment”; Dorussen and Gizelis, 
“Into the Lion’s Den”; Ruggeri et al., “Managing Mistrust.”  
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militarily strong factions tend to dominate.64 In other words, the UN influences how the 
peace dividend is distributed while generating new channels for sub-ordinate factions to 
have access to resources through compliance. Second, the UN seeks to raise public 
support for peace processes.65 Spoiling can be counterproductive when there is strong 
public support for peace.66  Through public information campaigns, the UN helps to 
create peace and reconciliation. Taken as a whole, UN involvement renders legitimacy 
and external recognition more valuable, prompting belligerents to re-evaluate their 
calculus for choosing violent actions.67  
Opportunities for spoiling are abundant when the number of warring factions is 
large and internal cohesion is low.68 As UN PKOs moderate both incentives and 
opportunities for reneging,69 they become especially influential in such fragmented 
environments. Factions that are most likely to veto a peace process find fewer 
opportunities to do so when the UN is involved. UN PKOs can also confine otherwise 
mobile rebel groups to a geographical space usually by deploying to frontlines and 
diminishing the physical space and opportunities available to spoilers.70 For example, 
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Mission in 
Ivory Coast (UNOCI) coordinated efforts to patrol the border regions between Liberia 
and Ivory Coast. UNMIL assisted the Armed Force of Liberia (AFL) to patrol the 
 
64 For a detailed discussion of the material incentives that UN PKOs bring, see Fortna, Does 
Peacekeeping Work?; Howard, Power in Peacekeeping. 
65 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Howard, Power in Peacekeeping. 
66 Darby, “The Effects of Violence”; Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out.” 
67 Hultman et al., “United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian.” 
68 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War. 
69 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
70 Beardsley and Gleditsch, “Peacekeeping as Conflict Containment”; Ruggeri et al., “On the 
Frontline”; Ruggeri et al., “Winning the Peace Locally.” 
17 
 
borders and maintain security.71 Thus, effective peacekeeping halts the escalation and 
spread of conflict, maintains trust in the peace process, and reduces areas of lawlessness 
where infighting becomes endemic.72  
Dealing with informational asymmetries 
UN PKOs address informational asymmetries. The bargaining framework formulates 
that lack of reliable information on capabilities, resolve and preferences complicates 
conflict resolution and incite fighting.73 Conflict parties have apparent incentives to 
misrepresent such information, and bargaining failures happen due to this inability to 
distinguish cheap talk from genuine claims. Again, fragmentation and UN peacekeeping 
intersect in the case of informational asymmetries. Even though, information 
asymmetries are particularly severe in fragmented conflicts, UN involvement provides 
more reliable communication platforms and facilitates the flow of credible 
information.74 Recently, Nomikos finds that UNPKOs increase the likelihood of 
institutionalized power-sharing agreements by providing information among factions.75 
The presence of UN PKOs becomes sufficient to alleviate information asymmetries.  
Peacekeeping missions have an advantage over other forms of conflict management 
because the deployment, even of small missions, tends to provide more transparency 
about the actions of government and rebel leaders, reducing uncertainty and inducing 
 
71 UN News, “Security a top priority.” 
72 Ruggeri et al., “On the Frontline”; Ruggeri et al., “Winning the Peace Locally”; Dorussen and 
Gizelis, “Into the Lion’s Den”; Ruggeri et al., “Managing Mistrust.” 
73 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.” 
74 Cunningham, “Divide and Conquer”; Cunningham, “Veto Players” ; Doyle and Sambanis, 
Making War; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
75 Nomikos, “Why Share?” 
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stability even in highly fragmented conflicts. Therefore, we expect UN to mitigate the 
adverse impact of fragmentation and make a more profound difference when there are 
substantial informational problems.  
Addressing coordination problems 
Coordination problems may render peace unachievable even if conflict parties are 
willing to cooperate. According to Doyle and Sambanis, the assistance of UN is 
paramount in enabling coordination.76 Doyle and Sambanis also warn that 
fragmentation makes coordination more difficult, thus the UN should adapt its peace 
operations accordingly by taking this obstacle into account.77 While we agree with their 
position, here we emphasize that these two mechanisms interact and the UN presence 
can have a moderating effect in addition to an additive impact. Peace processes tend to 
be volatile, but in fragmented conflicts they become explosive. UN PKOs provide much 
needed stability by decreasing the risks of accidental violence and skirmishes that may 
derail the whole process through conflict spirals.78 As coordination failures are 
especially likely when fragmentation is high, UN PKOs have more far reaching 
consequences at changing the prospects for peace.  
Implications 
Fragmentation is a major obstacle to peacebuilding, but we expect UN PKOs to provide 
a level of stability. The literature presents extensive evidence that fragmentation fuels 
violence and decreases the likelihood of conflict termination. Building on these well-
 
76 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War, 53-54. 
77 Ibid., 58. 
78 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
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established findings, studies on UN peacekeeping caution that achieving success is 
harder in fragmented conflicts, without formulating an interactive impact of the UN. We 
propose that the UN can make substantial difference in such fragmented environments. 
Therefore, our contribution is centred on the interaction between UN peacekeeping and 
fragmentation. We formulate the following two hypotheses:  
H1: UN peacekeeping operations mitigate the adverse impact of fragmentation on 
conflict duration. 
H2: UN peacekeeping operations mitigate the adverse impact of fragmentation on 
conflict intensity. 
Doyle and Sambanis stress that “the probability of peacebuilding success should 
be lower if more factions are involved in the peace process.”79 In fragmented conflicts, 
they add, “the prospects of sustainable peace are extraordinarily difficult” and “only 
exceptional multilateral and international commitment might succeed in overcoming 
incentives for resumed armed conflict.”80 We agree that compared to coherent conflicts 
with few actors, UN PKOs are less likely to achieve full success in fragmented civil 
wars. Shifting our focus, however, we formulate the impact of UN peacekeeping in 
fragmented conflicts in terms of what would have happened if the UN had not been 
involved.81 We argue that the difference that the UN makes is even greater in 
fragmented conflicts because without UN involvement achieving peace is extremely 
unlikely. We can simplify our point with an analogy: Firefighters may find it easier to 
 
79 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War, 96. 
80 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War, 329. 
81 Theoretically, we are also interested in the reverse condition: what would have happened if 
the UN had been involved in a fragmented conflict? 
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extinguish a small fire compared to a large-scale one, but their impact would be much 
greater in the latter.  
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) illustrates how a 
peacekeeping operation can make a huge difference while falling considerably short on 
fulfilling its official mandate. Based on an extensive review, Howard concludes that 
even though achieving the mandate of UNIFIL might not be attainable, the mission still 
“has helped to keep the peace – among militias during the Lebanese civil war, as well as 
between Lebanon and Israel since that time.”82 Howard’s in-depth analysis provides 
evidence that UNIFIL made a significant difference in the context of a highly 
fragmented conflict. Deployed during the Lebanese civil war in a territory that the state 
virtually did not exist and 36 different warring factions competed to establish control, 
UNIFIL discouraged spoilers through persuasion and inducements; facilitated the 
gradual encroachment of the state authority by addressing problems of lawlessness and 
power vacuums; successfully engaged in institution building; enabled communication 
and flow of information among opposing forces; and mitigated coordination problems.83 
As a result, UNIFIL first contributed to the conditions that led to the Taif peace 
agreement in 1990, which eventually terminated the Lebanese Civil War, and then 
helped to maintain the peace afterwards. Writing in 1987, Thakur stated that UNIFIL is 
“not a peacekeeping force, but a war-dampening force. Its mandated task is impossible 
to attain, yet its presence remains indispensable.”84 Focusing on the difference that 
UNISIL made in a hard and highly fragmented case, we share Howard’s conclusion that 
 
82 Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, 126. 
83 Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, 80-128. 




UNISIL is effective at saving lives and constraining violence even if it is not a success 
story in terms of fulfilling stated mandate and achieving positive peace.  
4. Research Design 
We adopt two approaches to investigate the impact of fragmentation on conflict 
processes and how UN peacekeeping moderates this effect. In line with our first 
hypothesis, we look at conflict duration by using the UCDP Conflict Termination 
Dataset (CTD).85 The CTD contains information on the start and end dates of conflicts 
globally for the 1946-2013 period. We limit our sample to civil conflicts and measure 
duration in terms of days in line with the conflict start and end dates available in the 
CTD.86 We expect fragmentation to be associated with longer conflicts, but we also 
expect this association to be conditional on UN peacekeeping. This is based on our 
theoretical conjecture that UN peacekeeping would dampen the conflict prolonging 
impact of fragmentation. We use the conflict-level version of the CTD, but as a 
robustness test we also incorporate our conflict fragmentation measure to the Kathman 
and Benson study, which analyses the impact of UN personnel deployment on the 
dyadic-level conflict duration.87 We report these results in Online Appendix. Our 
replication of Kathman and Benson yields results substantively identical to our main 
analysis presented here.  
 
85 Kreutz, “How and When.”  
86 We follow Thyne to identify and remove coups from our sample. Thyne, “The Impact of 
Coups.” 
87 Kathman and Benson, “Cut Short?” 
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To test the second hypothesis, we replicate an influential study by Hultman et 
al., which analyses battle related deaths in African civil conflicts from 1992 to 2011.88 
The outcome variable is the number of deaths due to fighting between a state-party and 
a non-state actor in a given month. Hultman et al. show that UN peacekeeping troop 
deployment is associated with a decrease in battle related deaths in the following month. 
Based on our theoretical framework, we expect higher fragmentation to increase 
conflict casualties in the following month, but again we expect this relationship to be 
conditional on UN peacekeeping; the higher the number of troops, the less profound the 
adverse impact of fragmentation. As our discussion on UNIFIL suggests, UN PKOs can 
have a profound impact on fragmented conflicts even if they fail to end the fighting. 
Overall, we analyse two outcome variables – (1) duration and (2) intensity – to 
test the argument that UN PKOs mitigate the adverse impact of fragmentation. These 
outcome variables are appropriate because our theoretical framework indicates that 
fragmentation should significantly increase both duration and intensity of conflict when 
the UN is not involved. Note that both duration and intensity are commonly used 
features to assess the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations.89 There is also an 
intrinsic link between the two, as a conflict is considered to be terminated only after the 
intensity falls below a certain threshold over a specified period of time. Therefore, the 
two outcome variables are complementary; they present different tests of our theoretical 
claim that the effectiveness of UN PKOs is conditional on fragmentation.  
Our approach also falls in line with the established literature in terms of studying 
duration and intensity separately to investigate the pacifying effect of UN peacekeeping. 
 
88 Hultman et al., “Beyond Keeping Peace.”  
89 Hegre et al., “Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing”; Sandler, “International Peacekeeping.” 
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This design is appropriate because examining an overall impact of UN peacekeeping is 
practically unattainable.90 
A growing number of studies present evidence that UN PKOs are deployed to 
hard-to-settle cases.91 The non-random assignment of UN PKOs brings a formidable 
hurdle for precise causal inference that quantitative studies have been unable to fully 
address.92 Identifying and leveraging strictly exogenous sources of variation in UN 
peacekeeping in civil conflicts is extremely difficult especially when the interest is on 
an interaction effect, as in this study.93 In line with most of the quantitative literature on 
UN peacekeeping, we consider selection mechanisms, possible confounders and 
alternative explanations through our model specification. We control for factors that 
may render a conflict hard-to-settle and influence fragmentation and UN deployment. 
Nonetheless, we caution that we do not present strictly causal estimates of UN 
peacekeeping effectiveness, but rather test the presence of conditional associations 
expected by our theoretical framework while controlling for possible confounders. 
Despite this limitation that we share with the extant literature, we posit that our analysis 
still advances the study of UN peacekeeping effectiveness by shedding light to a 
modifying mechanism that earlier studies have not considered. 
 
90 Sandler, “International Peacekeeping.” 
91 Beardsley and Schmidt, “Following the Flag”; Gilligan and Stedman, “Where Do the 
Peacekeepers Go?”; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
92 Beardsley et al., “Mediation, Peacekeeping”; Hegre et al., “Evaluating the Conflict-
Reducing”; King and Zeng, “When Can History”; Gilligan and Sergenti, “Do UN 
Interventions”; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?; Vivalt, “Peacekeepers Help.” 
93 Beardsley et al., “Mediation, Peacekeeping.” 
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Data on UN Peacekeeping 
We use data on UN peacekeeping operations from Kathman.94 For the conflict duration 
analysis, we generate a dichotomous variable, UNPKO, which indicates the presence of 
UN peacekeeping personnel in a conflict-year. This is a time-varying covariate, taking a 
positive value only after UN peacekeepers are deployed. Kathman also provides 
information on the number and type of UN personnel, but only 27 countries 
experiencing civil conflict received UN peacekeepers.  This brings significant 
constraints on estimation and prevents us to further breakdown the level of UN 
involvement to respective personnel numbers. Earlier research also considered UN 
peacekeeping as a dichotomous variable when investigating its impact on conflict 
duration.95 In a robustness analysis presented in Online Appendix, however, we 
breakdown UN personnel deployment to its respective numbers.  
For conflict intensity models, we follow the original study by Hultman et al. and 
use the number and type of UN personnel.96 Hultman et al. address estimation 
constraints by using fine-grained data on battle-related deaths at the monthly level. They 
also break down the type of UN personnel in terms of troops, police and military 
observers. As they attribute conflict dampening effect of peacekeeping to UN troops, 
we follow their approach and interact troops with our fragmentation measure.  
Conceptualizing and measuring conflict fragmentation 
Measuring conflict fragmentation is not a straightforward task. Although the dominant 
approach is to simply look at the number of actors in a conflict, this measurement does 
 
94 Kathman, “United Nations Peacekeeping.” 
95 Gilligan and Sergenti, “Do UN Interventions”; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? 
96 Hultman et al., “Beyond Keeping Peace”. 
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not capture differences between rebel groups in terms of their prominence within a 
conflict or the emergence of new conflict fronts. To illustrate, suppose conflict A has 
four active rebel groups and each government- rebel dyad accounts for 25% of the total 
battle-related deaths. Suppose another conflict, B, has also four active rebel groups, but 
one predominant dyad account for 95% of violence and other three dyads only account 
for the remaining 5% combined. Considering that total number of battle deaths should 
reflect the distribution of power, 97 conflict A should be more fragmented, and thus 
more intractable, compared to conflict B. Although these two conflicts would be 
different on their level of conflict fragmentation, looking only at the number of active 
rebel groups gives the exact same measure. 
We build the Conflict Fragmentation Index (CFI) to address this problem. We 
start with the premise that the distribution of combat activity among conflict-parties is a 
relevant measure to proxy fragmentation. Civil wars may have core actors responsible 
for most of the fighting, and tangential groups that marginally take part in conflict. 
Holding the total number of actors fixed, a conflict is less fragmented if most of the 
fighting is concentrated between specific actors, compared to conflicts that have the 
fighting more equally dispersed across conflict-parties. Therefore, depending on the 
concentration of combat activity, conflicts with equal number of actors can have 
different levels of fragmentation. To use the fragmentation through splintering as an 
example, if a non-state actor divides into two equally prominent entities, then 
fragmentation should increase more than a situation in which a relatively small 
component of the NSA disintegrates to form a new entity. 
 
97 Bakke et al., “A plague of Initials.” 
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The CFI takes the information on the prominence of conflict-fronts into account 
by adapting the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. It is calculated using the following 
formula; 







 is the relative prominence of a conflict-front. It can be approximated as; 
	
 =  
		    
 		   
Using this formula would give a CFI measure of 0.75 for our first hypothetical 
example, conflict A, whereas conflict B would have a CFI of roughly 0.10.  
For conflict duration, we use the casualty data corresponding to the CTD, which 
is the dyadic-level UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset.98 Following the formula, we 
calculate the share of each dyad on the total deaths within a conflict to build the CFI. 
Note that the CFI is a time-varying measure changing based on relative prominence of 
different conflict-fronts.  
The study by Hultman et al. already includes information on battle related deaths 
both at the dyad and the conflict level.99 We directly use this data to build the CFI. As 
the data is at the monthly level, we lag the CFI measure for a month. We expect a 
higher CFI in month m to produce more deaths in month m + 1. Our fragmentation 
index takes in information about dyadic battle related deaths. Despite using lags, this 
might generate a concern because of a link between fragmentation and the outcome 
variable. We argue that the two variables measure substantively different concepts. 
 
98 Melander et al., “Organized Violence.” 
99 Hultman et al., “Beyond Keeping Peace.” 
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Fragmentation is in relative terms measured at the conflict-level whereas the outcome 
variable is in absolute terms measured at the dyadic level. The correlation between our 
explanatory variable and battle deaths is -0.0068, suggesting that these two measures of 
conflict difficulty do not capture the same phenomenon. In line with the original study, 
we also control for lagged battle deaths.  
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between number of rebel groups and 
fragmentation by using data from Hultman et al.100 When there is only one rebel group, 
there is no fragmentation; hence CFI is equal to zero. When there are multiple rebel 
groups responsible for generating battle deaths, CFI takes a value between zero and one. 
If a single predominant dyad is responsible for most of the battle deaths, then CFI 
approaches to zero. For example, there is a considerable variation among conflicts with 
five rebel groups in terms of the volume of fighting within each government-rebel dyad. 
In all these cases, government forces fight with five different rebel groups but for those 
cases with low CFI rates, government forces fight with a predominant rebel group 
whereas other rebel groups only marginally contribute to the total battle deaths. On the 
other hand, for those cases with high CFI rates, government forces fight in multiple 
roughly equally bloody fronts. Moving from number of rebel groups to the CFI allows 
us to capture this variation in conflict dynamics.  
We contend that the CFI reflects conflict fragmentation better than the number 
of rebel groups active in conflict, which is the dominant approach in the literature. 
Bakke et al. argues that fragmentation is a function of not only number of rebel groups 
but also how pertinent these groups are to the conflict.101 We believe that the CFI 
 
100 Hultman et al., “Beyond Keeping Peace.” 
101 Bakke et al., “A plague of Initials.” 
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improves our ability to measure fragmentation by more closely capturing relevancy of 
groups. Nonetheless, we re-run our models with the traditional number of rebel groups 
measure as a robustness check. 
Control Variables 
Conflict intensity can impact both duration, CFI and prospects for resolution. To 
account for this, we control for cumulative sum of Battle Deaths.102 We lag this 
measure one year and take its natural logarithm. As natural resources can influence both 
rebel fragmentation and conflict duration, we control for this using the dichotomous 
Resources variable.103 Rebel fragmentation is likely to be correlated with conflict 
incompatibility and whether conflict has an ethnic dimension. We consider both conflict 
Incompatibility and Ethnic civil wars to account for this aspect. Incompatibility, which 
is taken from the CTD, identifies two distinct types to separate conflicts over acquiring 
governmental power from conflicts over acquiring territorial control. Ethnic is coded by 
using the ACD2EPR data.104 There is considerable overlap between incompatibility and 
ethnic civil wars as territorial conflicts are more likely to have an ethnic dimension. 
Based on measures of model fit, we only report results using the Incompatibility 
variable.  
Previous research showed that country-level factors can influence conflict 
duration and UN peacekeeping operations. These factors include population, GDP per 
capita and the level of democracy. To measure the level of democracy, we use V-Dem’s 
Polyarchy index, which is based on Robert Dahl's conceptualization of electoral 
 
102 Melander et al., “Organized Violence.” 
103 Clayton “Relative Rebel Strength”; Buhaug et al., “Geography, Rebel Capability.”  
104 Wucherpfennig et al., “Ethnicity, the state.” 
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democracy.105 The data on Population and GDP per capita are taken from Gleditsch.106 
We also include regional dummies because earlier research proposed that UN 
peacekeeping may have a geographical bias.107 As UN might be more inclined to 
intervene to militarily weak countries, we control for Composite Index of National 
Capability (CINC) available in the National Military Capabilities data.108 We also 
control for Explicit Rebel Support, which indicates whether a rebel group receives 
explicit support from a third country. This measure is taken from the Non-State Actors 
dataset.109 Finally, we control for whether the conflict is Internationalized or not, by 
relying on the type of conflict variable available at the CTD. 
5. Results 
We start our duration analysis with a series of Cox proportional hazard regressions. Cox 
models are commonly used to demonstrate the association between explanatory 
variables and time until an outcome event occurring –conflict termination in this case. 
Cox regression is appropriate for our purposes because we are interested in how 
different factors are related to conflict duration whilst we do not have any theoretical 
reasons to define the shape of the baseline hazard.110 Table 1 reports results from these 
models. A negative coefficient means that a variable is associated with decreased hazard 
rate, hence longer conflicts. Conversely, a positive coefficient indicates that an increase 
in the variable’s value is associated with a shortened conflict, holding all other variables 
 
105 Coppedge et al., “Varieties of Democracy.” 
106 Gleditsch, “Expanded trade.” 
107 Gilligan and Stedman, “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?” 
108 Singer et al., “Capability Distribution.” 
109 Cunningham et al., “It Takes Two.” 




As we expected, fragmentation –proxied by CFI– has a negative coefficient 
across models, meaning that higher fragmentation is associated with longer conflicts. In 
other words, the higher the fragmentation, the less likely a conflict is to be terminated in 
any given time. Model 1 presents results from the baseline model with only the core 
controls. Model 2 introduces UNPKO as a dummy without an interaction with the CFI 
variable. UNPKO is not significant and Model 2 performs worse than Model 1 in terms 
of model fit. Model 3 introduces an interaction term between CFI and UNPKO. 
Although the coefficient for UNPKO is still not significantly different than zero, the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant, indicating a possible mitigating 
effect of UN intervention on the conflict lengthening effect of fragmentation. Put 
differently, the joint effect of UN intervention and fragmentation leads to shorter 
conflicts.111  Model 4 presents the full specification including the additional control 
variables. The interaction term remains significant and the result is robust to alternative 
model specifications. Inclusion of the interaction term improves model fit in all model 
specifications considered. Model 5 replaces the CFI with No. of Rebel Groups, which is 
the conventional approach to measure fragmentation. Both No. of Rebel Groups and its 
interaction with UNPKO are statistically significant. Model 5 shows that CFI does not 
drive our results and the conventional approach also yields to similar results.   
 
111 In a regression model with a multiplicative interaction term between two variables, the 
individual terms for the two variables specified as interaction cannot be interpreted 
independently, as the net effect of each variable will depend on the level of the other 
variable and the coefficient for the interactive term, and the coefficient estimate for each 
of the individual term will depend on the scaling of the variables. In other words, one 
cannot differentiate the net effect of one independent variable on the overall model and the 
two variables must be interpreted together; see Braumoeller, “Hypothesis Testing.” 
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Although we do not find an unconditional association between UN intervention 
and conflict duration, our results are in line with our expectation that the UN has a 
possible conflict shortening effect through mitigating the adverse impact of conflict 
fragmentation. The correlation between conflict duration and UN peacekeeping is 
statistically insignificant in Models 1 and 2. This null result concurs with some recent 
studies.112 
We focus on Model 4 to explore the substantive impact of fragmentation on 
conflict duration and its modification by UN peacekeeping deployment. Figure 2 shows 
that when there is no UN peacekeeping deployment, fragmentation is associated with a 
31% decrease in the hazard rate (i.e. longer conflicts). This increase in duration is 
statistically different to no change at the 99% confidence level. Conversely, when UN 
peacekeepers are present, fragmentation is associated with 11% increase in the hazard 
rate (i.e. shorter conflicts), but this association is not statistically distinguishable from 
no change. Figure 3 further illustrates how predicted conflict duration changes with and 
without UN peacekeepers in different fragmentation scenarios. When there is no 
fragmentation (left panel of Figure 3), conflicts with and without UN peacekeepers 
follow very similar duration patterns. However, when CFI is equal to 0.4 (right panel of 
Figure 3), which is roughly the median fragmentation level when we observe 
fragmentation, conflicts involving UN peacekeepers (dashed line) end quicker 
compared to conflicts without UN peacekeepers (solid line).  
Next, we turn to the number of battle related deaths in African civil wars to 
investigate how the implications of our theoretical framework would change the 
 
112 Gilligan and Sergenti, “Do UN Interventions”; Kathman and Benson, “Cut Short?” 
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findings of an influential study by Hultman et al.113 Table 2 presents results from the 
negative binomial regression on the number of deaths in a given month. Model 6 is the 
replication of the original results by Hultman et al. Note that when the total number of 
battle deaths is equal to zero, CFI is undefined because the denominator is also zero. In 
order to address this problem, we reduce our sample to observations to conflict-months 
with battlefield deaths. Model 7 shows that reducing our sample by dropping 
observations following non-conflict months does not substantively influence the 
original findings. In Model 8, we introduce our lagged CFI variable. As we expected, 
CFI is positive and significant, indicating that higher fragmentation in a month is 
associated with higher battle deaths in the following month. Put differently, 
fragmentation generates more conflict as predicted by our theoretical framework. Model 
9 includes an interaction term between UN Troops and CFI. The interaction term is 
negative and significant. Thus, considering the joint effect of UN Troops and CFI, 
increasing the number of troops mitigate the adverse effect of fragmentation. 
Figure 4 illustrates the marginal effect of CFI conditional on number of UN 
troops. When there are no UN Troops and all other co-variates are held at their means, 
we estimate that the marginal effect of CFI on the predicted number of deaths in a 
conflict-month to be positive and significant. When there are UN Troops, however, this 
figure quickly declines and becomes indistinguishable than zero, which suggests that 
larger number of UN Troops may mitigate the impact of fragmentation on battle deaths.  
Based on Model 9, Figure 5 plots the predicted number of battle deaths with 
respect to different CFI scores. The blue line shows predicted deaths when 7000 UN 
troops are deployed, which is roughly the median number of troops when there is UN 
 
113 Hultman et al., “Beyond Keeping Peace”. 
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involvement in a conflict. The red line indicates no UN troop deployment. All other 
covariates are held at their means. Based on point estimates, increased CFI is associated 
with higher battle deaths when there is no UN troop deployment whereas when there are 
7000 UN troops, increases in CFI is associated with decreasing predicted number of 
deaths. Again, the difference between number of deaths in UN and no UN cases are 
most distinguishable when fragmentation is higher. 
6. Conclusion 
Conflict fragmentation is a major hurdle to peacemaking. It intersects with local 
dynamics, facilitates spoilers who oppose a peace process and increases both the 
intensity and duration of fighting. Closely associated with failed attempts at making 
peace, these adverse traits suggest that UN PKOs may find it harder to effectively 
support peace processes in highly fragmented conflicts. Nonetheless, the empirical 
literature also shows that UN missions tend to be deployed in hard cases where the 
prospects for peace are slim. Does the UN remain ineffective in such hard and highly 
fragmented conflicts?  
In this article, we argue that contrary to common perceptions, UN PKOs can be 
successful at addressing problems arising from fragmentation. We present evidence that 
UN involvement interacts with fragmentation, dampening its conflict augmenting 
impact. Compared to UN involvement, fragmented conflicts are both longer and 
deadlier when the UN is not involved to support a peace process. Thus, it is in these 
very difficult and highly fragmented conflicts that UN presence becomes so important. 
Our findings raise the possibility that in cases of small and relatively uncomplicated 
conflicts, other external actors might have a role in facilitating peace processes. In 
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fragmented conflicts, on the other hand, UN missions can have a unique impact in 
reducing the duration and level of violence.  
Our findings also suggest that the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping is likely to 
be conditional on conflict features. UN PKOs contribute to peace through discouraging 
spoilers, addressing commitment problems and facilitating coordination and 
communication among belligerents. However, these hurdles are not uniform across 
different conflicts and the difference that UN involvement would make is conditional on 
the severity of obstacles against peace. For example, when commitment problems are 
severe, we should expect UN involvement to make a more profound contribution 
towards peace. Similarly, when spoiler violence is particularly threatening a peace 
process, enhancing moderates and discouraging spoilers become especially crucial. 
Therefore, we conclude that when assessing the effectiveness of a UN PKO, focusing 
only on immediate outcomes in terms of mandate fulfilment and achieving full peace 
might be misleading. As demonstrated by UNIFIL, peacekeeping might have a 
significant impact in a hard and highly fragmented conflict, substantially influencing 
conflict dynamics. Even if fulfilling mission mandate or achieving positive peace is 
beyond reach, the UN can be effective at saving lives and changing incentives towards 
more peaceful behaviour.  
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Table 1: Cox Proportional Hazard Regression on Conflict Duration. Global 
Data, 1990 – 2012. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Baseline UNPKO Interaction Full Alternative 
CFI -1.20* -1.20* -2.00** -1.83**  
 (0.57) (0.56) (0.66) (0.66)  
UNPKO  0.10 -0.01 -0.09 -0.78 
  (0.16) (0.18) (0.20) (0.48) 
CFI * UNPKO   2.26* 2.37*  
   (1.01) (1.03)  
Incompatibility -0.34* -0.32† -0.33* -0.34† -0.33† 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) 
ln Real GDP p.c. -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13 -0.12 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) 
ln. Population -0.14** -0.14** -0.14** -0.16† -0.15† 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
Polyarchy -0.47 -0.48 -0.47 -0.64† -0.65† 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35) 
ln. Cumulative  -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.24*** 
    Battle Deaths(t-1)       (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Resources -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Rebel Exp. Sup.     -0.36* -0.35* 
           (0.18) (0.18) 
CINC    1.31 1.26 
    (5.39) (5.35) 
Internationalized      -0.51† -0.50† 
Conflict    (0.29) (0.30) 
Group No.     -0.59** 
     (0.21) 
Group No. * UN PKO     0.70* 
     (0.34) 
Regional Dummies ☓ ☓ ☓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations 833 833 833 832 832 
AIC 1636.67 1638.34 1636.88 1595.21 1594.76 
Log Likelihood -811.3 -811.2 -809.4 -801.4 -801 
No. of Subjects 224 224 224 223 223 
No. of Failures 199 199 199 199 199 
Robust standard errors clustered on conflict are in parentheses 




Table 2: Negative Binomial Regression on Battlefield Deaths in Civil 
Conflicts in Africa, 1992-2011. 






CFI(t-1)   1.245* 1.381** 
   (0.497) (0.497) 
UN Troops(t-1) -0.130* -0.145*** -0.139*** -0.137*** 
 (0.051) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
UN Troops(t-1) * CFI(t-1)    -0.622*** 
             (0.101) 
Battle Deaths(t-1) 0.009*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
UN Police(t-1) 0.227 0.199 0.177 0.250 
 (0.195) (0.174) (0.176) (0.185) 
UN Observers(t-1) 2.732* 2.733* 3.132* 3.184* 
 (1.344) (1.178) (1.227) (1.253) 
Ceasefire -0.075 0.068 0.049 0.049 
 (0.389) (0.303) (0.317) (0.317) 
Rebel Strength 0.385 0.323 0.279 0.272 
 (0.303) (0.262) (0.245) (0.243) 
No. of Rebel Groups 0.009 -0.100** -0.104** -0.104** 
 (0.063) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
ln Population 0.063 0.163 0.181 0.182 
 (0.188) (0.198) (0.187) (0.186) 
Biased Intervention 1.413*** 0.577* 0.558* 0.567* 
 (0.420) (0.292) (0.273) (0.269) 
Constant 1.151 1.586 1.371 1.359 
 (2.130) (2.174) (2.044) (2.034) 
Observations 5,861 2,465 2,465 2,465 
Log Likelihood -11858 -8541 -8534 -8529 
Robust standard errors clustered on conflict-dyad are in parentheses 






Figure 1: Conflict Fragmentation Index and Number of Rebel Groups 
 
 





Figure 3: Predicted Survival Functions 
 
 




Figure 5: Predicted Number of Battlefield Deaths 
 
